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A Discussion Paper

Protecting Community Rights in Kosovo's Electoral Reform

Working Towards a
Stable Multi-Ethnic Kosovo



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ECMI Kosovo

ECMI Kosovo is the principal non-government organisation engaged with minority issues in Kosovo, with the overarching aim to develop inclusive, representative, community-sensitive institutions that support a stable multi-ethnic Kosovo.

ECMI Kosovo contributes to the developing, strengthening and implementation of relevant legislation, supports the institutionalisation of communities-related governmental bodies, and enhances the capacity of civil society actors and the government to engage with one another in a constructive and sustainable way.

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Electoral Reform in Kosovo

Discussion Paper

28 November 2011

1. Introduction

This paper aims to both contribute to and stimulate the discussion on electoral reform from the perspective of minority communities. Drawing on ECMI Kosovo's well-established cooperation and consultations with representatives of minority communities, and based on the legal framework in force in Kosovo, this discussion paper maintains that any reform in the electoral system must continue to guarantee the rights of minority communities and ensure their meaningful participation in the political process.

Kosovo is currently engaged in discussion on the reform of its electoral system as a result of the 12 December 2010 national elections, which highlighted two major problems with the electoral system. Firstly, the elections have been characterised by widespread irregularities, which although prevalent throughout Kosovo, were particularly severe in the Drenica region. Secondly, the election of the President by the newly elected Assembly proved to be highly problematic; Mr. Behgjet Pacolli's election as the President of Kosovo on 22 February 2011 was declared to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, on 28 March 2011, and only following an agreement on the reform of the *Law on General Elections* (LGE), were the PDK, Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Alliance for New Kosovo (AKR) able to agree on Ms. Ahtifete Jahjaga as a compromise candidate and elect her as President on 7 April 2011. The agreement on electoral reform concerned the direct election of the President and the replacement of a single Kosovo-wide electoral constituency with separate, multiple electoral districts. This latter proposal can be mostly interpreted as deriving from the wish of the LDK to isolate possible future irregularities in the Drenica region to one electoral district, and thus limit its impact on the overall election results.

Based on this political agreement, on 22 April 2011, the Assembly of Kosovo established an *ad hoc* Committee for Amending the Law on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo¹, also consisting of an Election Reform Working Group (ERWG). In its initial phase of work, the ERWG has identified five key areas of intervention: election zones, conditional voting, polling stations, as well as sanctions to political entities violating the relevant laws and rules and election threshold. In addition to these, the Committee has also organized open public debates on the election reforms in seven regional centres in Kosovo and held discussions with relevant stakeholders. According to their work plan, this Committee will finalize the report with recommendations and submit it to the Assembly plenary session for approval by March 2012.²

¹ For more information see <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=2,110,116>

² Conclusions of the 2nd Plenary of the Stabilisation Association Process Dialogue Meeting, Friday, 1 July 2011, Pristina, Kosovo, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_kosovo/111116sap_dialogue_plenary_conclusions_2011_final.pdf

In this paper, ECMI Kosovo sets out the minimal criteria that must be met for the new electoral system to guarantee the rights of minority communities. Subsequently, ECMI Kosovo sketches the basic outlines of a reformed electoral system, based on these criteria. The paper will not analyze the administration of the elections nor the institution of the Central Election Commission, as this topic is receiving sufficient attention.

2. Kosovo's electoral system in brief

The current election system is established by the Constitution, the LGE, rules developed by the Central Election Commission (CEC), as well as other legislation such as the Citizenship Law, Law on Languages and relevant sections of the Criminal Code. The Law on Financing of Political Parties (LFPP) governs the finances of political parties.

Members of the Kosovo Assembly are elected for four-year terms, and the seats are allocated according to a proportional representation system using the *Sainte-Laguë* formula. The *Sainte-Laguë* method allocates seats approximately proportional to the number of votes a party receives. It is also used in New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Germany (on the federal level), and Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others. There are 120 seats in the Assembly, 100 of which are won through open elections and distributed among all eligible parties (for ease of use, these will be referred to as non-guaranteed seats). Ten seats are guaranteed for the representatives of the Serb community, and another ten for other minority communities.³

Example – Seats Allocation

Example 1: During the second term of the Assembly, when the transitional provisions were in place, if parties representing the Serb community win 3 seats and no other minority communities win any unreserved seats, then this means that the Serb community will have a total of 13 seats. 10 seats will be distributed among the other minority communities in accordance with the Constitution. The remaining 97 out of 100 unreserved seats will be shared by parties or candidates representing the Albanian community.

Example 2: During the third term of the Assembly, when the transitional provisions are no longer applicable, if Albanian parties win 97 seats, and parties representing the Serb community win 3 seats and no other minority communities parties win any seats, then the Serb communities will receive an additional 7 seats, bringing them to the guaranteed minimum of 10 seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The other minority communities will also have a total of 10 seats as guaranteed. This leaves 100 seats remaining to be allocated among the Albanian parties.

The twenty guaranteed seats are allocated according to Article 64.2 of the Constitution, which states that these seats are the minimum number of seats guaranteed for each minority community and that minority communities will be allocated more than this number only if their total number of seats won through the open elections is higher than the minimum set out by the guaranteed seats. This means that if, for example, the Serb community would win five seats through open elections, they would be allocated all ten guaranteed seats, while if they would win 12 seats through the open elections, they would be allocated both the ten guaranteed seats, plus an additional two seats from the 100 non-guaranteed seats.

³ Roma community - 1 seat; Ashkali community - 1 seat; Egyptian community - 1 seat; 1 additional seat for either the Roma, Ashkali or Egyptian community with the highest overall votes; Bosniak community - 3 seats; Turkish community - 2 seats; Gorani community - 1 seat

During the first two election cycles of the Republic of Kosovo, however, transitional provisions were operative in accordance with Article 148.1 of the Constitution, which states that the seats guaranteed for minority communities are additional to any seats they may have won from the 100 non-guaranteed seats (Article 148). These transitional provisions were for the last time applicable in the December 2010 elections.

Kosovo has a single nation-wide electoral district. This current electoral system is a result of a process of evolution. As Kosovo's status was unclear during much of the initial phase of establishing governmental institutions following the 1999 conflict, a single Kosovo wide electoral district was favoured due to its simplicity, even though the three major Albanian parties – LDK, PDK and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) – all expressed a preference for the creation of multiple electoral districts. Moreover, the OSCE Mission argued that as up-to-date population data was unavailable, it would be unfeasible to create unbiased electoral districts. In order to avoid delays to the first Kosovo Assembly election in 2001, the Albanian parties agreed to the single-electoral district system.⁴

The election system is based on a 'partially open' candidate list which attempts to achieve two – sometimes conflicting – objectives: first, to allow voters to indicate their own preference for candidates on a party list; and second, to ensure that at least 30% of elected candidates are of the less represented gender (female).⁵ The need for 30% of elected Members of Assembly to be female – rather than 30% of nominated candidates – means that some preference votes may be ignored. The current structure of the gender quota suggests a conflict between democratic development and gender equality.

Article 111.2(a) of the LGE provides that only parties or candidates that have won at least 5% of all votes are eligible for the 100 unreserved seats. This minimum threshold requirement, however, does not apply to parties or candidates representing minority communities thus making it easier for minority communities to win non-guaranteed seats.

3 Minority Rights in Electoral Reform in Kosovo

One national electoral district is preferable for minority communities. As different ethnic groups reside all around Kosovo, a single electoral district avoids the fragmentation of communities along electoral boundaries. The current system allows a proportional outcome for minority communities overall, because it does not disadvantage voters from minority communities who live in regions that are more sparsely populated by them. In other words, in the current single-district electoral system, minority community voters can be equally represented, regardless of their place of residence. Moreover, the single electoral system fosters cooperation of minority communities across different regions of Kosovo, thus promoting exploration of common interests and alliances. Such collaborations can also strengthen the political power of minority communities.

⁴ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo: Landmark Election*, Report 120, 21 November 2001, p 5.

⁵ EU Election Expert Mission to Kosovo (EU EEM), *Final Report*, 25 January 2011, p 24; Articles 110.3, 110.4 and 111.6 LGE.

However, in light of the agreement between the LDK, AKR and PDK, it is highly likely that multiple and separate electoral districts will be created in the reform process. In order to ensure that the delimitation process in Kosovo takes into account the rights and interests of minority communities, ECMI Kosovo recommends that the whole election system reform process is carried out by taking into consideration the following guidelines:

3.1 Clean up the Voters Lists

A quick comparison of the preliminary results of the Kosovo census of 2011, which estimates the population of Kosovo to be around 1.733.872 people, and the size of the electorate according to the 2010 voter lists (1,630,636 voters), shows that there are inaccuracies in the voter lists; considering the number of children under 18 that are not eligible to vote, the electorate should be significantly smaller than the total population. These inaccuracies make the electoral system vulnerable to fraud, and are a problem for both majority and minority communities that should be urgently addressed.

3.2 Use existing administrative boundaries

Drawing boundaries for electoral districts is a contentious issue. There are two options for delimiting a territory into electoral districts. Firstly, it is possible to use the existing administrative boundaries, such as the former UNMIK administrative regions or the municipalities. Or, secondly, new and specific electoral constituency boundaries can be drawn for electoral purposes.

The creation of a new set of electoral districts in Kosovo would be a complex and expensive task. First, information on population and voter registration would need to be collected. Electoral districts must be created without bias to the size of political parties, and must also ensure that minority communities continue to have political representation at the Assembly. District plans would have to be drawn up, and each village, town or municipality must be assigned to specific districts. Any plan must be based on geographic and demographic data. A process of consultation with government, municipal officials, minority communities, civil society organisations and other stakeholders on the feasibility of the electoral boundaries must then take place. The new electoral boundaries must then be finalized once consensus has been reached. If the new electoral boundaries are created without such procedures, significant room is left for gerrymandering, i.e. the creation of electoral boundaries specifically designed to benefit certain political parties.

In ECMI Kosovo's view, this is not a viable option for Kosovo considering its limited financial and institutional capacities, it therefore recommends the use of existing administrative boundaries. Voters would be more familiar with the existing administrative units, while new administrative boundaries would create overlaps with existing administrative units and cause further confusion. The use of existing administrative boundaries as electoral districts has the advantage of simplicity for the voters and efficiency for the government.

3.3 Use UNMIK regional boundaries

There are several existing administrative subdivisions in Kosovo which may be used as electoral boundaries, two of which will be considered in detail in this paper: the 5 UNMIK administrative

regions and the current 37 municipalities of Kosovo. This does not mean that other administrative subdivisions, such as the six regions used for Kosovo number plates, could not be used as electoral boundaries, but rather that these would be comparable to either of these two options (i.e. a large number of smaller districts, such as municipalities, or a limited number of large districts, such as the former UNMIK administrative regions).

There are 37 municipalities in Kosovo, often with a largely homogenous population in terms of ethnic affiliation.⁶ The use of such high numbers of electoral districts can be difficult to administer. Some municipalities have too small a population to form a viable constituency, a concern particularly relevant for minority communities. This could also result in a significant difference in the relative weight of a vote. For example, a vote in the municipality of Klokot/Klllokot, with less than 5,000 inhabitants and allocated 1 Assembly seat, would have almost eight times the weight of a vote in Kaçanik/Kacanik, almost 40,000 inhabitants and also allocated 1 Assembly seat.⁷ More importantly, the repetition of the same units at municipal and Assembly level may further encourage entrenched and identity politics rather than cross-ethnic issue based politics.

The 5 UNMIK administrative regions are well known to voters and represent a compromise position between a single electoral district system and a multiple electoral system based on municipalities. It encompasses heterogeneous groups and multiple communities of interests, which opens up the potential for issue-based politics. ECMI Kosovo proposes these boundaries as the starting point for the delimitation of electoral districts.

Table 1: Distribution of Kosovo municipalities according to the UNMIK administrative regions

Centre (Prishtinë / Priština)	Fushë-Kosovë/Kosovo Polje; Gračanica/Gračanicë; Lipjan/Lipljan; Obiliq/Obilić; Podujevë/Podujevo; Prishtinë/Priština; Glogovac/Glogovac; Shtime/Štimlje;
North (Mitrovicë / Mitrovica)	Leposavić/Leposaviq; Mitrovicë/Mitrovica; Skënderaj/Srbica; Vushtrri/Vučitrn; Zvečan/Zveçan; Zubin Potok
West (Pejë / Peć)	Deçan/Dečani; Gjakovë/Djakovica; Istog/Istok; Junik/Junik; Klinë/Klina; Pejë/Peć
East (Gjilan / Gnjilane)	Ferizaj/Uroševac; Hani i Elezit/Đeneral Janković; Kacanik/Kaçanik; Kamenicë/Kamenica; Klokot-Vrbovac/Klllokot-Vërboc; Novo Brdo/Novobërdë; Partesh/Partesh; Ranilug/Ranillug; Štrpce/Shtërpçë; Viti/Vitina; Gjilan/Gnjilane
South (Prizren)	Dragash/Dragaš; Malishevë/Mališevo; Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša; Prizren; Rahovec/Orahovac; Suharekë/Suva Reka

⁶ There are currently 37 municipalities in Kosovo, of which 1 has a Turkish majority population, 9 have a Serb majority population and the remaining have Albanian majority populations. For more information on the ethnic makeup of the Kosovo municipalities please consult www.ecmi-map.com.

⁷ For a breakdown of the division of seats among municipalities see Table 8.

**Table 2: Regional
Voter Turnout**

2010 Voter Turnout	
Gjilan / Gnjilane	46.59%
Mitrovicë / Mitrovica	35.91%
Pejë / Peć	40.88%
Prishtinë / Priština	52.21%
Prizren	45.85%

It is important to note that the division of Kosovo into electoral districts creates a problem in maintaining the proportionality of the election results, due to the large differences in voter turnout between electoral districts. In the December 2010 elections, the voter turnout in the Prishtinë/Priština region was 52.21% while the voter turnout in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region was only 35.91%. If the allocation of seats to electoral districts is purely based on population statistics, this difference will cause a significant discrepancy in the relative weight of a vote in different districts, with, for example, a vote in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region being worth significantly more than the same vote in the Prishtinë/Priština region. For example, if the allocation of seats would be based on the respective size of the electoral districts, the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica district would be assigned 14 seats and the Prishtinë/Priština district 25 seats, while if the allocation of seats was purely proportional to the voter turnout the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica district would be assigned only 11 seats and the Prishtinë/Priština district 29 seats.⁸ This situation is mainly caused by the boycott of the 2010 elections by the Serb community in northern Kosovo, a situation that could be replicated in future elections, considering the current situation in the area. Therefore, ECMI Kosovo recommends that voter turnout is taken into consideration in the allocation of Assembly seats to the electoral districts.

3.4 Maintain current safeguards for minority communities

In the design of the new election system based on multiple and separate electoral districts, ECMI Kosovo believes it is essential that all the current safeguards for the protection of the rights and interest of minority communities are maintained. Accordingly, below are outlined some of the main provisions that must be incorporated in any election reform.

3.4.1 No threshold for parties representing minority communities

As explained above, the 5% threshold does not apply to parties or candidates representing minority communities, making it easier for minority communities to win non-guaranteed seats. Considering that minority communities are estimated to constitute no more than 10% of the whole national population, it would be extremely difficult for any party or candidate representing minority communities to win 5% of votes. To require parties or candidates to reach the minimal threshold would effectively disallow the parliamentary representation of minority communities in the Kosovo Assembly. Therefore, the exemption of candidates or parties representing minority communities from the threshold requirement is necessary to ensure their participation in the legislature. ECMI Kosovo recommends that this provision is retained in any reform.

3.4.2 Guaranteed seats retained

As explained above and set out in the Constitution, in the current election system there are 120 seats in the Assembly of which 20 are guaranteed for representatives of minority communities. In

⁸ See table 7 for the full comparison of seat allocation between the size of the electorate and the voter turnout.

ECMI Kosovo's view, these constitutional provisions must be maintained. They facilitate the meaningful participation of minority communities in the Kosovo Assembly by ensuring that minority communities cannot be easily dismissed due to their small numerical size. The strong presence of minority communities in the Assembly (vis-à-vis their overall population size) is necessary. Otherwise, the presence of minority communities in the Assembly would only be tokenistic.

3.4.3 Possibility of holding more than guaranteed seats must be clear

In the election reform, it must be made clear that if representatives of minority communities in the open elections, win more than the number of guaranteed seats, then they must be allocated such seats from the 'open' pool of 100 seats. For example, if Serb political parties win 12 seats, then the community must be allocated the 10 guaranteed seats plus 2 seats from the unreserved seats. Assuming no other minority communities wins more seats than their guaranteed seats, 98 seats will remain for allocation among representatives of the majority Albanian community.

3.4.4 No parallel electoral system for minority communities


There must be no separate elections or parallel electoral systems created for the election of seats guaranteed to minority communities. Any such move would further marginalize minority communities and isolate them from the political mainstream. Reforms to the electoral system must enhance the integration of minority communities in the political process. Therefore, minority community parties must always first compete for the non-guaranteed seats, and only subsequently be assigned guaranteed seats. Accordingly, minority community parties must be included on the general election ballot, as is currently the case.

In the current system, each seat won by a minority community political party from the 100 seats would be reallocated to the 20 guaranteed seats (unless exceeding the number of guaranteed seats), while the vacated seat is reallocated proportionally to non-minority community parties. This system must be maintained also in a system of multiple electoral districts. Below is provided an illustration of how this theory could be applied to a multiple district system.

This system raises the questions of how to allocate the guaranteed seats not won through the open elections and how to reassign the nonguaranteed seats vacated by the reallocation of the minority community parties' seats to the guaranteed seats. This latter reallocation could be done either on the basis of regional or national results. ECMI Kosovo proposes to base this calculation on the national results, since this, as explained above, avoids the marginalisation of minority community members living in regions more sparsely populated by them.

EXAMPLE:

Of all minority community parties only the Serb SLS party succeeds in gaining a (1) seat through the regular elections for the 100 seats. This seat is won in the Gjiilan / Gnjilane region. This means that the one seat will be reallocated to the separate guaranteed seats. The remaining nine Serb guaranteed seats will be distributed proportionally to all Serb political parties, while the seat vacated in the Gjiilan / Gnjilane region will be reassigned to the majority community parties.



4. Proposed Electoral Reforms

In summary, ECMI Kosovo proposes the following features in any reformed electoral system:

- 5 electoral districts are created based on the UNMIK administrative boundaries, in line with updated population statistics;
- Minority communities will continue to be exempt from the threshold requirement;
- 20 seats to remain guaranteed for representatives of minority communities;
- Minority communities retain the technical possibility of winning more than the guaranteed seats;
- No parallel elections for minority communities.

To illustrate the consequences of such a system, ECMI Kosovo has conducted a simulation based on the data from the December 2010 national elections and using the parameters set out above.⁹ For the purpose of the simulation, the 100 non-guaranteed seats are allocated proportionally to each district based on the most recent voter lists, from the same December 2010 national elections.¹⁰ The turnout is not taken into consideration in the allocation of seats. Additionally, a few more parameters were applied which were necessary to make this simulation possible, but which ECMI Kosovo is not necessarily advocating for: the five percent threshold for non-community parties is applied; all proportional reallocations take place based on the *Sainte-Laguë* formula; and, the reassignment of the vacated nonguaranteed seats is based on a recalculation of the results of the

⁹ For the breakdown of the December 2011 results please consult annex 2, table 9.

¹⁰ For the full breakdown of the division of seats please see annex 2, table 7.

districts where those seats were vacated, disregarding the vote for minority community parties. The detailed results of this simulation are presented below in annex 1, while a narrative analysis of the results is presented below.

4.1 Analysis of Simulation

According to this simulation, community parties would win a total of five seats out of 100 through the open elections; Serb parties would win a total of three seats (SLS 2 seats and JSL 1 seat), the Turkish community would win 1 seat (for the KDTP) and the Bosniak community would win 1 seat (for the VAKAT coalition).

This means that these five community seats would be reallocated to the guaranteed seats and a further 15 guaranteed seats would have to be allocated to minority communities, based on the nationwide results of all community parties. No community would get more than the number of guaranteed seats for that community. The final division of the 20 set aside seats is displayed in annex 1, table 4.

It is interesting to note that if the guaranteed seats had been allocated directly based on nationwide results (displayed in annex 1, table 5), rather than first reassigned from the non-guaranteed district seats, there would be only one difference in the results: the VAKAT party would have gained one instead of two seats, while the Bosniak party BSDAK would have gained one seat instead of none.

Generally, this simulation shows that community parties can win a (limited) number of seats through the regular elections, but are unlikely to win more than the guaranteed seats. Moreover, the proposed multi-district system does not produce results that differ greatly from the previous single-district system, although it slightly benefits larger political parties both of minority and majority communities; in a single-district election one additional community party would have won a seat, while the largest majority community parties (PDK and LDK) would have won fewer seats.

5 Conclusions

ECMI Kosovo has used this paper to discuss the implications of the proposed reform of the Kosovo election system from a single electoral district to multiple separate districts for minority communities. Additionally, it has proposed several guidelines to ensure that community rights are respected in any reformed system. The proposals developed in this paper are not meant to provide the definitive shape of a future electoral system, but rather to provide general guidelines for policy makers in designing such a system. ECMI Kosovo first argues that a single electoral district is the preferred system for minority communities, as it avoids the fragmentation of communities along electoral boundaries. However, considering that the creation of multiple electoral districts is likely, several issues have been raised:

- The creation of electoral districts should be **based on existing administrative subdivisions** and not be designed from scratch as this leaves too much room for gerrymandering;

- The creation of electoral districts should be **large and few in number**, such as the former UNMIK regions, in order to ensure that the districts encompass heterogeneous groups and multiple communities of interests, thus opening up the potential for issue-based politics;
- The **voting lists must be cleaned up**, as they are full of inaccuracies affecting both minority and majority communities;
- **Voter turnout must be taken into consideration** in the allocation of seats to electoral districts in order to ensure the proportionality of the election results;
- **Existing safeguards** in the election process for minority communities **must be maintained**:
 - No threshold for political parties representing minority communities;
 - 20 guaranteed seats must be maintained;
 - Minority community parties must have the technical possibility of winning more than the guaranteed votes, if they win sufficient votes in the open elections;
 - Minority community parties must first participate in the open elections before being assigned the guaranteed seats, in order to avoid the further marginalisation and isolation of minority community parties.

Finally, it should be noted that the creation of multiple electoral districts does not differ greatly in the election results it produces when compared to a single district system, except that for both majority and minority community parties it provides a slight advantage to the larger parties.

ANNEX 1: SIMULATION RESULTS

Table 3: division of 100 seats, before the reallocation of community seats

	PDK	LDK	AKR	LDD	AAK	VV	SLS	JSL	KDTP	VAKAT	
	Albanian						Serb		Turkish	Bosniak	
East	6	4	2	0	2	4	1	1			20
West	4	5	2		6	2					19
Centre	9	10	2			4	1				26
North	10	2				2					14
South	8	6			3	2			1	1	21
TOTAL	37	27	6	0	11	14	2	1	1	1	100

Table 4: allocation of set aside seats

Party	Community	# of seats from regular elections	Allocation of remaining set aside seats	Total division of set aside seats
SLS	Serb	2	5	7
JSL	Serb	1	2	3
KDTP	Turk	1	1	2
VAKAT	Bosniak	1	1	2
NDS	Bosniak	0	1	1
PDAK	Ashkali	0	2	2
IRDK	Egyptian	0	1	1
PREBK	Roma	0	1	1
GIG	Gorani	0	1	1

Table 5: allocation of set aside seats through separate nationwide elections

Party	Community	# of Seats
SLS	Serb	7
JSL	Serb	3
KDTP	Turk	3
VAKAT	Bosniak	1
NDS	Bosniak	1
BSDAK	Bosniak	1
PDAK	Ashkali	2
IRDK	Egyptian	1
PREBK	Roma	1
GIG	Gorani	1

Table 6: division of 100 seats following the reallocation of community seats

	PDK	LDK	AKR	LDD	AAK	VV	Total
East	7	5	2	0	2	4	20
West	4	5	2		6	2	19
Centre	9	10	3			4	26
North	10	2				2	14
South	9	7			3	2	21
TOTAL	39	29	7	0	11	14	100

ANNEX 2: TABLES

Table 7: Voter Turnout of the December 2010 divided by regions

	Electoral population	Total Turnout	Turnout (Percentages)	Allocation of Seats (based on the electoral population)	Allocation of Seats (based on the turnout)
East	327,725	152,679	46.59%	20	21
North	232,222	83,385	35.91%	14	11
West	312,854	127,883	40.88%	19	17
Centre	422,459	220,555	52.21%	26	30
South	335,376	153,763	45.85%	21	21
Total	1,630,636	738,265		100	100

Table 8: Division of Seats to municipal electoral districts, based on 2010 Voter Lists

	% of Kosovo population	Allocation of 100 seats
Ferizaj/Uroševac	5.63	5
Gjilan/Gnjilane	5.36	5
Hani i Elezit/Đeneral Jankovic	0.49	1
Kaçanik/Kacanik	1.86	1
Kamenicë/Kamenica	2.17	2
Novobërdë/Novo Brdo	0.49	1
Štrpce/Shtërpçë	0.77	1
Viti/Vitina	2.63	2
Ranilug/Ranillug	0.3	1
Klokot/Kllokot	0.17	1
Parteš/Partesh	0.23	1
Leposavic/Leposaviq	1.02	1
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	5.32	5
Skenderaj/Srbica	3.02	3
Vushtrri/Vucitrn	3.88	3
Zvečan/Zveçan	0.52	1
Zubin Potok	0.46	1
Deçan/Decani	2.28	2
Istog/Istok	2.5	2
Junik	0.32	1
Klinë/Klina	2.37	2
Pejë/Pec	5.75	6
Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje	1.72	2
Glogovac/Glogovac	2.86	2
Lipjan/Lipljan	3.09	3
Obiliq/Obilic	1.31	1
Podujevë/Podujevo	4.64	5
Prishtinë/Priština	9.89	10
Shtime/Štimlje	1.37	1

Gracanica/Gracanica	1.03	1
Dragash/Dragaš	2.25	2
Gjakovë/Dakovica	5.96	6
Malishevë/Mališevo	2.7	3
Mamusa/Mamushë/Mamuša	0.19	1
Prizren	8.87	9
Rahovec/Orahovac	3.02	3
Suharekë/Suva Reka	3.53	3
Total		100

Table 9: December 2010 election results divided per region

	Pejë/ Pec	Prishtinë/ Priština	Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica	Prizren	Gjilan/ Gnjilane	Total
	West	Centre	North	South	East	
PDK	20,826	64279	46,470	50,683	41964	224,222
LDK	28,220	66844	11,639	36,312	29470	172,485
AKR	12,530	17550	3,380	5,292	12176	50,928
LDD	3,267	3233	666	2,374	5372	14,912
AAK	35,280	8969	3,528	17,898	11428	77,103
KDTP	47	1044	711	6,030	705	8,537
PSDK	254	1026	121	429	1012	2,842
VAKAT	673	100	253	4,212	58	5,296
SLS	437	5480	638	371	6240	13,166
SDSKIM	22	595	78	125	174	994
SDA	1,152	125	63	211	50	1,601
SNS	45	602	13	37	45	742
NDS	170	10	19	2,259	19	2,477
GIG	108	50	13	602	12	785
SKMS	12	122	17	114	216	481
IRDK	1,318	185	21	114	52	1,690
PREBK	113	84	6	429	58	690
FER	3,351	6285	737	1,807	2949	15,129
Vetëvendosje	12,386	29548	8,418	12,424	25790	88,566
JSL	95	804	316	485	3810	5,510
BSDAK	143	71	44	1,512	48	1,818
SSDS	62	321	10	32	355	780
CDS	71	104	30	56	47	308
SDSG	68	12	12	486	20	598
LEK	687	99	24	125	73	1,008
PAI	75	857	92	114	247	1,385
KTB	39	169	58	1,039	58	1,363
GIKN	11	70	52	48	24	205
SNSD	16	17	3	35	191	262
Total	121,478	208,655	77,432	145,655	142,663	695,883